Saul Kripke - Wikipedia
Saul Aaron Kripke (/ ˈkrɪpki /; November 13, 1940 – September 15, 2022) was an American analytic philosopher and logician. He was Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and emeritus professor at Princeton University.
Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth
2016年2月11日 · Kripke’s theory of truth (Kripke, The Journal of Philosophy 72 (19), 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it.
Rigid Designators - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2006年10月24日 · Kripke (1980;1971) famously argues that because a rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds, an identity statement in which both designators are rigid must be necessarily true if it is true at all, even if the statement is not a priori.
Appendix A: Kripke models for modal logic - Stanford …
Kripke model. Given a nonempty set \(\sP\) of propositional letters and a finite nonempty set \(\sA\) of agents, a Kripke model is a structure \[ M=(W,R,V) \] consisting of a nonempty set W of worlds identifying the possible states of affairs that might obtain,
Rule-Following and Intentionality - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2022年4月12日 · Kripke allows that the sceptic’s proposal is “absolutely wild”, and that she is “crazy” if she “proposes [her] hypothesis sincerely”. He grants, however, that it is not logically impossible, and so “there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute” that hypothesis (1982: 9).
‘quadding’, where quaddition is a function that generates the same results as addition for every previous calculation in which Kripke thought he was adding, but which produces the answer ‘5’ for the sum ’68 plus 57’. In other words, the sceptic challenges Kripke to justify his belief that he followed the rule for
14 - Kripke's Normativity Argument - Cambridge University Press ...
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke presented an argument to the effect that there can be no facts as to what someone means by a linguistic expression. In this argument, a central role is played by the contention that meaning is a normative notion.
Kripke's argument proceeds mostly by elimination: he considers, and rules out, various proposals as to what the fact of meaning addition might consist in. Two in particular are worth highlighting. The one which Kripke discusses in more detail is that your meaning addition by the word "plus" is a fact about your dispositions with respect to that ...
Kripkean Meta-Semantics and Generalized Rigidity
2019年1月7日 · The classification-cum-explanation Kripke assigns to rigidity requires the notion to apply to singular and general terms alike. But Kripke's own notion of rigidity is tailor-made for singular terms, and an extensive debate has not secured a general notion of rigidity apt to provide the classification-cum-explanation Kripke aims for.
Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens
2022年11月17日 · Kripke assumes (fictitiously) that 57 is such a number and uses it to define the “quaddition” function, which agrees on the addition function for argument values less than 57, but returns the value 5 for all other arguments. The skeptic then puts forward the skeptical hypothesis that “by ‘plus’ . . . [Kripke] always meant quus.”